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The FSLIC Bailout and the Economy
The Bush Administration's proposal for raising
the funds to cover deposit liabilities at hundreds
ofinsolvent thrifts is gathering momentum in
the Congress. One provision would raise $50
billion "off budget" through bonds issued by a
federally-sponsored agency. (That debt would
add to the nearly $40 billion in liabilities already
amassed by the Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corporation-FSLlC-in handling insol-
vent institutions prior to this year.) The principal
on the bonds issued by the federal agency would
be covered by zero coupon bonds that would be
purchased with resources from the thrift industry.
However, the Treasury would be responsible for
most of the interest. (See Letter of March 31,
1989.)
This raises a question: if the cost of servicing
this debt really is the Treasury's obligation,
shouldn't the liability be "booked:' that is, put
on the federal budget and added to the federal
budget deficit? On this question, Martin Feld-
stein recently argued that this debt legitimately
belongs off budget since debt financing of FSLlC
expenses will not affect aggregate demand, raise
interest rates, nor crowd out private investment.
This Letter shows that this argument is true
only in a narrow context. The actual issuance of
agency bonds merely would "book" government
debt that, in effect, already has been incurred.
However, in a broader context, because the
method of financing government spending seems
to affect saving and spending decisions, govern-
ment debt incurred in connection with deposit
insurance liabilities does have macroeconomic
consequences. Accordingly, steps should be
taken to ensure that in the future changes in
the expected expenses of the deposit insurance
system are not ignored in the federal budget
process.
Redistribution of losses
Thrifts become insolvent when the value of
their assets falls below that oftheir liabilities.
To society as a whole, such a decline iii value
represents a loss of wealth, which in itself should
have a negative effect on aggregate demand.
Deposit insurance cannot diminish the size of
this loss. But the existence of deposit insurance
and the method used to finance it may affect the
incidence ofthe loss, by protecting depositors of
failed institutions and placing the burden on
others in the economy.
Payouts by the deposit insurance fund, then, can
be viewed as transfer payments to depositors.
When the reserves of the deposit insurance fund
are inadequate to cover these payouts, as in the
case of the FSLlC currently, funds have to be
raised from other sources. To the extent that the
solvent portion of the industry cannot raise the
needed funds, taxpayers may be called on to
bear a share of the losses in order to honor the
deposit guarantees.
Raising taxes
Such a. transfer would mean that depositors as a
group would be better off than iftheywere not
insured, but currenttaxpayers generally would
be worse off. With no net change in wealth, this
transfer should not have any additional effect on
aggregate spending and interest rates, assuming
depositors' tastes regarding spending and saving
broadly reflected those of society as a whole.
This argument suggests that although the actual
loss in wealth has an effect on the economy,
shifting the burden of that loss from one group
(depositors) to another (taxpayers) should not
have an impact.
A simple numerical example can help illustrate
the economic consequences of financing FSLlC
expenses through taxation. Consider first the
case where no deposit insurance is provided.
Starting with a healthy thrift industry that holds
$100 million in loans funded by $90 million in
deposits and $10 million in capital, household
wealth is $100 million (since deposits and thrift
stock are both assets). If an economic catastrophe
were to reduce the value of the thrift industry's
loans by $30 million, the industry would be
insolvent and household wealth would decline
by $30 million. Without deposit insurance,FABSF
depositors would absorb $20 million of losses
and equity holders would absorb $10 million.
When deposit insurance costs are financed
through current taxes, the outcome in terms of
private credit and household wealth is identical
to that for the case.qf no deposit insurance. To
make depositors whole, the government would.
payout $2Qmillion, increasing taxes by an equal
alJlountto cover the liability. thus,.household
wealthwould decline by $30million: $10 mil-
lion from the loss in the value ofthe thrift indus-
try's stock and $20 million associated with the
increase in taxes. The thrift industry would hold
$70 million in loans and total deposits would
equal $70 million. Thus, the volumeofprivate
credit and household wealth would be unaf-
fected by deposit insurance when it .is financed
through current taxes. As a consequence, an
FSLlC bailout financed through taxes should not
affect the economy.
Debt financing
How does this scenario change when the FSLlC
shortfall is covered by issuing government debt?
Some have argued that budget deficit~ hav~ the
same economic consequences as. raising taxes.
When faced with a futuretaxliability associated
with an increase in governmentborrowingtoday,
so this. argument goes, rational households will
increase their currentsaving to·generate suffi-
cient resources to cover thehigherfuturetax
liability. As a result, spending will be curtailed
by the same amount as if currenttaxes had been
raised. Thebond~ held by households would not
increasewealth since there would be an offset-
ting increase infuture tax liabilities. Thus,using
debt toJinance the FSLlC bailout would not be
stimulative.
An extension of the earl.ier example will help
to illustrate this point. Instead of raising taxes
by $20millionto cover.the loss to depositors,
assumethat the governmentissues $20 million
in bonds and gives these bonds directly to the
thrifts. In this case,deposit liabilities would total
$90 million and assets would total $90 million~
$70 million in. loans and $20 million in govern-
ment bonds. As in the case of tax-financed
deposit insurance, household netwealth would
-'Cdecline bythe $10 million capital loss and by the
$20 million future tax fiabilitythat the bonds
represent.
Changing the example so that the government
sells the bonds to the public does not alter these
results. For example, households could purchase
the $20 million in government bonds and the
government then would inject cash into the thrift
industry to make up the loss to depositors.
Assuming households draw down their holdings
of deposits to purchase the bonds, the net result
would be that the thrift industry would have $70
million in loans and the public would have $70
million in deposits. The $20 million in bonds
held as assets by households would be balanced
by a future tax liability of $20 million. Thus,
household wealth still would decline by $30
million.
However, other economists have argued that
households may not perceive their net worth as
declining by the full $30 million, particularly
ifsome of this future tax burden falls on future
generations and current households place a
higher value on their own spending than they
do on the spending of future generations. In this
case, households probably will not increase their
saving to compensate fully for higher future
taxes. As a result, government budget deficits
would transfer wealth from future generations
to the current generation.
In the two debt-financing examples above, if
current households ignore entirely the liability
created by the government debt, the effective
decline in wealth for current households would
be only $10 million, the value of the thrift stock,
rather than $30 million. The $20 million in
government bonds would be perceived as adding
to current household wealth since the expected
rise in taxes in the future would not be perceived
as a liability. In the near term, this smaller
decline in household wealth would mean higher
aggregate demand and interest rates than if
current taxes had been increased.
The examples show that depositors and thrift
stockholders are not any better or any worse
off when insurance costs are financed through
government debt rather than through taxes. The
difference between the two methods of financing
deposit insurance lies in the way current tax-
payers view the future tax liability connected
with the $20 million in government debt. On
the one hand, if current taxpayers treat the future
taxes as a current liability, there will be nodifference between tax-financed and debt-
financed deposit insurance. On the other, if
current taxpayers do not view themselves as
liable for the future tax burden, debt financing
can affect current wealth, inducing more current
spending and less future spending. In the near
term, this would be stimulative and would boost
interest rates relative to the levels that would
have prevailed if deposit insurance were
financed through current taxes.
The experience in the 1980s suggests that house-
holds do not adjust saving fully to compensate
for an increase in future tax liabilities. Since
1982, the federal budget deficit has increased
very sharply, but the U.s. saving rate has con-
tinued to decline. This evidence suggests that an
increase in government borrowing does affect
aggregate demand over and above the effects
on demand from an increase in government
spending.
Booking the debt
Thus, government debt incurred in covering the
deposits of insolvent thrifts does have economic
consequences. This does not mean, however, that
the act of issuing the $50 billion in bonds to
assist the FSLlC will have an impact. Since most
of the problem thrifts have been insolvent for
some time, the expenses and government debt
already have been incurred as far as their eco-
nomic consequences are concerned. Executing
the plan to assist the FSLlC merely would book
the debt, and should have no additional impact
unless the amount of debt issued is materially
different from that expected.
Treasury or agency?
Part of the debate in the Congress concerns using
a federal agency rather than the Treasury to issue
the $50 billion in bonds. By using a federal
agency to issue the debt, the proceeds from the
bonds would be treated as revenue that offsets
FSLlC's expenses. Although federal agency debt
is somewhat more costly than direct Treasury
debt, the practical appeal of this approach is that
it would be easier to meet the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings targets for the federal budget deficit.
The use of agency, or off-budget, debt also has
been rationalized on the grounds that the "new"
debt has no economic consequences. Although
this argument technically is true in the sense
that booking debt that already has been incurred
should have no further consequences, it fails to
acknowledge the real economic impact of this
previously unbooked liability. Thus, if there is
an economic rationale for issuing the bonds on
an off-budget basis, it is merely that two wrongs
do not make a right. That is, it was wrong to
exclude the unbooked expenses of the FSLlC
frompast budgets. That wrong cannot be cor-
rected by increasing budget deficits in the
immediate future to reflect past losses.
Fundamental problem
The more fundamental problem with the argu-
ment that using debt to finance FSLlC expenses
does not have economic consequences is that it
provides erroneous guidance concerning how
future "unbooked" deposit insurance liabilities
should be handled. This argument implies that
since debt incurred by the government (or the
FSLlC) does not have economic consequences, it
is okay in the budget process to ignore unbooked
expenses incurred by the FSLlC in the future. The
analysis in this Letter suggests the opposite; debt
financing (whether implicit or explicit) does
affect the economy and should be taken into
consideration.
In principle, then, any increase in the expected
cost to the deposit insurance system of resolving
problems in the future should be included in the
federal budget as a current expense, in accord-
ance with generally accepted accounting prac-
tices. Alternatively, regular deposit insurance
premia should not be counted as future federal
revenues since, in theory, such premia merely
reflect the change in the value of the future
unbooked liabilities ofthe deposit insurance
system. However, in its estimates of the budget
effects of the Administration's proposal to assist
the FSLlC, the Office of Management and Budget
includes future deposit insurance premia from
both banks and thrifts as revenue that offsets
FSLlC expenses in resolving current problem
thrift cases. Such treatment of these insurance
premia means that the true macroeconomic im-
pact of changes in deposit insurance liabilities
will not be reflected in future federal budgets.
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